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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants do not dispute that before a claim for permanent
total disability can be made, the employee must prove an injury and
a

disability.

Until

a

person

becomes

disabled

he

cannot

successfully bring a claim for permanent total disability in the
Industrial Commission; hence, disability is the last event to occur
in the cause of action for permanent total disability.

Because

that is the last event necessary, Mr. Vigos could not file until it
occurred.

Furthermore, he could not have known of this cause of

action on October 13, 1988, which was the date he fell. He did not
learn that he was permanently totally disabled until years after
the fall.

That is when the statute should begin to run.

Defendants

fail

to

address

Mr. Vigos'

claim

that

his

constitutional rights were violated because he had less than six
years to file a claim from the occurrence of the last event, which
was his disability.

However, even if this court accepted the

social security administration determination that Mr. Vigos was
disabled on January 1, 1993, then he had until January 1, 1999 to
file a claim.

Defendants are punishing injured employees who act

in good faith to return to the work force.

Additionally, the

defendants are taking away Mr. Vigos' only remedy before he had any
practical opportunity to pursue it.
Utah State Ins. Fund v. Dutson, 646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982)
applies to this case. Defendants claim that employees must file an
application for hearing for every claim.
1

However, if an employee

cooperates with the insurance carrier and never has a need to file
a formal application for hearing until after the statute of
limitations has run, then the Industrial Commission will never get
jurisdiction over these cases. To adopt the defendants' position
would have a chilling effect on cooperation between the parties
undisputed claims.
Defendants failed to dispute factual matters that were raised
twice below.

Now defendants decide they need to dispute those

assertions and they cite to factual matters that are not part of
the record. Defendants' action is contrary to well established law
in Utah. Defendants also did not move this court to supplement the
record.

Therefore, this Court should strike the portions of

defendants' briefs that rely on facts outside of the record.
ARGUMENT

REPLY POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ADDRESS THE
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT THAT AN INJURED
EMPLOYEE MUST BE DISABLED BEFORE PERMANENT
TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS CAN BE PAID THIS COURT
CAN INFER DEFENDANTS CONCEDE THIS ISSUE
A. UNTIL A PERSON BECOMES DISABLED HE CANNOT
SUCCESSFULLY BRING A CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION: HENCE,
DISABILITY IS THE LAST EVENT TO OCCUR IN THE
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
In applicant's first brief he asserted that there must be
both, an accident and an injury, before an employee can claim
workers' compensation benefits.

Applicant also asserted that a
2

claim for permanent total disability has an additional element
before an injured employee can obtain benefits: the employee must
suffer both an injury and the inability to work after medical
stabilization. In other words, the employee must also be disabled.
The defendants did not address either of these assertions in their
briefs. Consequently, this Court can infer that defendants concede
these issues.
Frankly, defendants cannot argue otherwise.

Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-67(1) states:
(1) In cases of permanent total disability
caused by an industrial accident, the employee
shall receive compensation as outlined in this
section.
Permanent total disability for
purposes of this chapter requires a finding by
the commission of total disability, as
measured by the substance of the sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security
Administration under Title 2 0 of the Code of
Federal Regulations as revised.
(Emphasis
added).
Id.

Nevertheless, defendants try to deny Mr. Vigos his benefits

because they simply ignore this requirement. The Fund's assertion
on page 16 of its brief is a prime example of this.

Defendants

claim, "[t]he Petitioner's injuries were apparent on the date of
the accident." It is undisputed that Mr. Vigos was not permanently
totally

disabled

on October

13, 1988.

His

permanent total

disability did not manifest until years later.
Defendants also make contradictory statements about when Mr.
Vigos became disabled, thus highlighting a very important question
of fact that the Industrial Commission never resolved. Defendants

3

statement that Mr. Vigos' injuries were "apparent" on October 13,
1988 belies their following admissions:
disability

on

January

24,

19941;

2)

1) that he applied for
that

Social

Security

Administration decided he was disabled on January 1, 1993; and, 3)
that he was still working on October 25, 1994.

(The Fund's brief,

pp. 16 and 18).
Not only does the Fund make statements that are inconsistent,
but the Fund's brief and the Industrial Commission's brief are also
at odds. Beginning on page 2 of the Industrial Commission's brief,
the Commission sets forth the required "questions and evaluations
to be made in sequence" for a claim of permanent total disability.
The questions and evaluations are as follows:
1.
Is the claimant engaged in a substantial
gainful activity?
2.
Does the claimant have a medically severe
impairment?
3.
Does the severe impairment meet or equal
the duration requirement in 20 CFR 404.15092,
amended April 1, 1993, and the listed
impairments in 2 0 CFR Subpart P Appendix 1,
amended April 1, 1993?
4.
Does the impairment prevent the claimant
from doing past relevant work?

The Social Security Administration denied this application on June 14,
1994.
(R. 30) Mr. Vigos then asked for reconsideration on October 28, 1994, which
was also denied.
(R. 3 0) The second denial was not dated; however, presumably it
was denied after the October 28, 1994 request.
(R. 30) In following defendants'
logic, when Mr. Vigos was denied social security disability benefits he could
reasonably conclude that he also did not have a worker's compensation claim, either.

2

§

404.1509

states:

How long the impairment must last.
Unless your impairment is expected to result in death, it must have lasted or
must be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. We call this
the duration requirement.
(Emphasis added).

4

5.
Does the impairment prevent the claimant
from doing any other work?
Industrial Commission's brief, p. 2-3.

It defies logic how Mr.

Vigos' injuries "were apparent" on the day he fell when Mr. Vigos
could not meet the above requirements for several years after
October 13, 1988. Moreover, the Fund cites to the medical records
that report Mr. Vigos was released to return to work on May 8f 1989
without restrictions. (R. 207) The Fund also cites Dr. Erickson's
report that states:
While his areas of impairment mayf at least
temporarily, limit his ability to function at
the same level of intensity, speed, and acuity
to which he was previously accustomed, he
clearly continues to be a very bright, capable
man, with many options for employment and
enjoyable leisure pursuits.
(R. 225)

Mr. Vigos is at a loss as to how those two reports make

his injury apparent on the day he fell.

Clearly there is a

question of fact as to whether Mr. Vigos could meet the disability
test until after the statute of limitations had run3. Defendants'
claim that Mr. Vigos knew of his injury on the day he fell is
unsupported by the facts and is unpersuasive.

B. DEFENDANTS DC) NOT UNDERSTAND LARSON
In support of Mr. Vigos' claim he cited to Larson's Workmen's
Compensation. §7 8.42(a). Defendants try to distinguish Mr. Vigos'

Both the Fund and the Industrial Commission assert that in any claim
for permanent total disability, where there is not an award from SSA, the Commission
will apply its own independent judgment of whether an employee is disabled or not.
If that is so, then the Social Security Administration determination that Mr. Vigos
was disabled on January 1, 1993 is totally irrelevant.

5

case by claiming the statute cited in Larson is only a one year
statute

of

limitation.

limitation

as opposed

to a six year

statute of

Larson states:

A rigid claims period may operate unfairly not only
because the nature, seriousness, and work-connection of
the injury could not reasonably be recognized by the
claimant, or perhaps even by the claimant's doctor, but
in many cases because the injury itself does not exist in
compensable degree during the claims period. This latent
or delayed injury problem presents in the sharpest relief
the senselessness of uncompromising time periods. The
classic illustration is that of the apparently trivial
accident that matures into a disabling injury after the
claim period has expired. A worker is struck in the eye
by a metal chip, but both he and the company doctors
dismiss the accident as a petty one and of course no
claim is made, since there is no present injury or
disability. Eighteen months later a cataract develops as
the direct result of the accident. If the statute bars
claims filed more than one year after the "accident," and
if the court applies the statutory language with
draconian literalism, the worker can never collect for
the injury no matter how diligent he is: he cannot claim
during the year, because no compensable injury exists; he
cannot claim after the year, because the statute runs
from the accident. (Emphasis added).
Id. Defendants do not seem to understand that the language used by
Larson applies to all "uncompromising time periods/" not just a one
year time period. Larson then uses the facts of a one year statute
of limitation as "[t]he classic illustration . . . ."

Larson is

criticizing every statute of limitation that has uncompromising
time periods, not just a one year statute of limitations.
Therefore, this Court should remand the case to the Industrial
Commission

and

order

it to determine when Mr. Vigos became

disabled. Then from that date compute when the six year statute of
limitations started.

To rule otherwise leaves Mr. Vigos with no

remedy at all.
6

REPLY POINT II
DEFENDANTS DO NOT ADDRESS THE CLAIM OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION IF THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS IS SHORTENED.
A, IF THE LAST EVENT FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
OCCURS ABOUT bVi YEARS AFTER THE INITIAL INJURY, THEN
A CLAIMANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ARE VIOLATED
IF HE HAS LESS THAN SIX YEARS TO FILE
Defendants position violates Mr. Vigos' due process rights and
his constitutional rights to the courts as provided in the Utah
Constitution, Article I, § § 7

and 11.

Defendants claim that

because Mr. Vigos applied for social security benefits on January
24,

19944

he

should

have

also

applied

for

permanent

total

disability benefits. However, what is lacking in this argument is
any discussion of footnote 4 in Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah
1993), wherein the Supreme Court stated:
The effect of the four-year repose period differs with
respect to causes of action that accrue before and after
the four-year period. The statute of repose shortens the
statute of limitations as to causes of action that accrue
before the repose period expires. For example, when
knowledge of the injury is acquired more than two years
but less than four years after the act of malpractice,
the repose period shortens the time in which a known
action must be filed to less than the two-year statute of
limitations. Thus, the nearer the end of the four-year
period one acquires knowledge of the injury, the shorter
the time one has to file an action. Conceivably one could
be required under the statute to file an action the same
day one learned of it. That might well raise significant

Defendants also state, "The Petitioner also retained counsel to
represent him at his social security disability proceedings where evidence of his
industrial injury was presented." The Fund's brief, p. 19. What defendants fail
to tell this Court is that Mr. Vigos did not retain counsel for that hearing until
February, 1995. Presumably the hearing was after Mr. Vigos retained counsel for the
hearing.

7

constitutional problems. (Cites omitted and emphasis
added).
Id, at 576.

This was cited in applicant's first brief and

defendants simply do not respond to it. This Court can reasonably
infer from the defendants failure to respond to footnote 4 of the
Lee v. Gaufin case, that defendants perceive the constitutional
violation will result in applying the statute as defendants do.
As shown above, defendants do not challenge Mr. Vigos'
assertion that a claim for permanent total disability has an
additional element of disability before an injured employee can
obtain benefits. This is significant in Mr. Vigos' claim that the
statute is a statute of repose.

Mr. Vigos raised the issue that

permanent total disability benefits are more akin to death benefits
than other worker compensation benefits. Again, defendants failed
to address this claim.
In Hales v. Industrial Comm'n., 854 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1993),
the applicant claimed and the Industrial Commission agreed with the
applicant and stated in its order, "that the statutory provision in
section 35-1-68(2) violated the Utah Constitution's open courts
provision by extinguishing [the applicant's] constitutional right
to litigate a valid claim before [the applicant's] right to file
that claim arose." This Court came to the same conclusion. Id. at
542.

That is exactly the issue in this case. Mr. Vigos' right to

litigate his valid claim was extinguished before his right to file
the claim arose. Even if the date of January 1, 1993 is accepted,
then the cause of action did not accrue until then and the statute
would not have expired until January 1, 1999.
8

Moreover, given a different set of facts the defendants'
position would lead to inconsistent results.

For example, if Mr.

Vigos had filed for social security benefits on October 12, 1994,
according to defendants logic, because he filed within the six
years he is barred from filing for permanent total disability.
However, what if Mr. Vigos had filed for social security on October
15, 1994, one day after the statute had run?

Because defendants

failed to address this issue at all, it is unclear if they believe
a claimant should be denied benefits. However, it can be presumed
that defendants do not think they would have this defense.
The only way that a person's constitutional rights can be
protected for a permanent total disability claim when there is a
delayed onset is to start the statute when the last event necessary
to complete the cause of action happens. It is undisputed that the
last event is when the employee is disabled.

Even if this Court

accepts the Social Security Administration's decision that Mr.
Vigos was disabled on January 1, 1993, he still had until January
1, 1999 to file.

He filed well within that time.

If this Court were to adopt the defendants' position, the
Industrial Commission will be flooded with applications so that
employees can preserve a possible claim regardless of the extent of
the injury. This Court can take judicial notice that thousands of
workers are injured each year in Utah.

Every one of these people

will be required to file a claim for permanent total disability
within

six

years

regardless

of

condition.
9

their

medical

and

physical

Additionally, this type of "draconian" application of the
statute will have a chilling effect on injured workers who try to
return to the work force.

Defendants are punishing workers who

attempt to stay in the work force instead of rewarding them for
their good faith efforts. This would also fly in the face of Utah
Code Ann. §35-10-1, et seq.

(Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act).

Although this statute was enacted after Mr. Vigos' fall and does
not apply in this case, a decision by this Court that concurs with
defendants will have a tremendous impact on this statute. In §3510-2 the intent of this statute is to "promote and monitor the
state's and the employer's capacity to assist the injured worker in
returning to the work force as quickly as possible and to evaluate
the cost effectiveness of the program."

Id.

(emphasis added).

Because defendant's are punishing employees who are trying to get
back into the work force, many will chose not to return.

B. MR. VIGOS ACTED WITH DUE DILIGENCE
Defendants argue that this case in more like Avis v. Board of
Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 837 P.2d 584, 588 (Utah App. 1992) and
Middlestadt v. Industrial Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993).
However, in those cases, the employee knew he or she had an injury,
the employee was not totally disabled, and there was no delayed
onset of the injury.
compensation

This Court stated in Avis., " [t]he workers'

statute, however, does not require stabilization

before filing for benefits." Avis, 837 P.2d at 588. However, Mr.
Vigos had stabilized and returned to work.
10

In his mind Mr. Vigos

did not have any additional claims to file for until years later.
The workers' compensation statute for permanent total disability,
"requires a finding by the commission of total disability, as
measured by the substance of the sequential decision-making process
of the Social Security Administration under Title 2 0 of the Code of
Federal Regulations as revised."
emphasis added)5.

(Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67(1)

As shown in Reply Point I, disability means the

applicant is not gainfully employed and cannot or will not be for
12 consecutive months.
This case is more like Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah
1981), which this Court cited in Avis. In Myers the district court
dismissed the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations.
The Utah Supreme Court accepted plaintiffs' claim that they acted
with "due diligence" in trying to discover the whereabouts of the
decedent. _ld. at 87. The Court also concluded that the defendant
could not establish that he was prejudiced by having to defend the
stale claim.

Id.

The Court went on to say:

In contrast, plaintiffs could not file an
action
for
damages
or
even
initiate
investigative efforts to determine the cause
of a death of which they had no knowledge.
Plaintiffs therefore had no alternative other
than to bring their action after the statutory
limitation period had expired. If plaintiffs
are denied the opportunity of proceeding with

It could be argued that the language of this statute requires the
Commission to make a finding on every claim for permanent total disability to
determine if the claimant is disabled before the statute of limitation's defense is
addressed
Such a reading of the statute would be consistent with applicant's
position because, if the claimant is disabled, the Commission could then determine
when the applicant became disabled
The applicant would then have six years from
that date to file a claim.
If the claim was filed beyond that time and the
defendant properly raised the affirmative defense that the claim was filed after the
statute of limitations had run, then the claim could be dismissed

11

that action, the law would be in the untenable
position of having created a remedy for
plaintiffs and then barring them from
exercising it before they had any practical
opportunity to do so, (Emphasis added).
Id.

The

Supreme

Court

concluded

that

the Myers

case had

appropriate circumstances to apply the "exceptional 'discovery
rule'" and concluded that the cause of action did not accrue until
plaintiffs discovered the death, so long as they were able to prove
"due diligence"6.

Id.

In the present case, Mr. Vigos claimed defendants were not
prejudiced

in this case, and the defendants, again, did not

respond. Furthermore, the Industrial Commission's decision creates
"the untenable position of having created a remedy for [the
applicant] and then barring [him] from exercising it before [he]
had any practical opportunity to do so."

:id.

(Emphasis added).

In footnote 8, of Myers, the Court states, "[t]his is not a
case where the fact of death was known but the cause of the fatal
accident was not." Ld. The present case is analogous because Mr.
Vigos did not know the fact of his disability until years later.
If this Court affirms the Commission's decision in this case,
it would take away Mr. Vigos' only remedy in violation of his
constitutional rights. Therefore, this Court must remand this case
and rule that Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 is unconstitutional and,
thereby, allow Mr. Vigos to pursue his benefits.

The Court remanded the case to the district court and stated, "[a]11
we hold here is that it was improper for the trial court to dismiss plaintiff's
action on the pleadings on the basis of the statute of limitations." Myers v.
McDonald, 635, P. 2d at 87.
The Court directed the lower court to allow the
Plaintiffs to prove they had acted with due diligence. Id.

12

REPLY POINT III
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION ONCE
THE EMPLOYEE 1) REPORTS AN INJURY TO THE
EMPLOYER AND THE COMMISSION AND 2) HE MAKES A
CLAIM.
Defendants try to argue that Utah State Ins, Fund v. Dutson,
646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982), is not applicable because it interprets
different statutes. As can be seen in Mr. Vigos' first brief, that
was acknowledged.

However, the new language in those statutes did

not overrule Dutson.

Consequently, Dutson is still good law.

It

also applies to this case.
What the Supreme Court stated in Dutson, is that an employee
must do two things: first, give notice to the parties and the
Commission of the material facts and, second, make a claim.

If an

employee only gives notice of an injury and makes no claim for
benefits, then there is no jurisdiction.

If an employee was

injured and simply notified the employer of the injury, but made no
claim, eventhough he knew he had a claim, then the Commission has
no jurisdiction.

The Commission also could not "modify" the

injured employee's benefits because it has no jurisdiction.
Contrary to defendants claim,

Mr. Vigos does not totally

disregarded §35-1-78(3), which states that the Commission cannot
modify statutes of limitations.

Mr. Vigos does not even suggest

such a position. If a timely claim has been filed, then Commission
has jurisdiction and the statute of limitations does not apply. On

13

the other hand, if an injured employee fails to timely file a
claim, then the Commission does not have jurisdiction.
However, if an employee was injured, gave notice to the
employer and the Industrial Commission and made a claim for
benefits, then the Commission has jurisdiction over that injury.
This is consistent with Stoker v. Workers' Compensation Fund of
Utah

889 P.2d 409 (Utah 1994), wherein the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
Nevertheless, Stoker may still have a remedy
under the Act. It would be ironic for the Act
to be construed in such a fashion that a
worker who undertakes a conservative course of
therapy within the time allowed by the
statute, which if effective would save the
Fund money and be less risky to the worker,
would be denied benefits when that course
proves ineffective and a more aggressive
therapy must then be pursued, resulting in
temporary total disability that occurs outside
the eight-year period. Had the more aggressive
therapy been undertaken at the time of the
less aggressive therapy, Stoker would have met
the
requirements
for
additional
total
disability benefits.
Id. at 412. The Supreme Court then concluded that even though it
was more

than

eight

years

post

injury, the

Commission

had

continuing jurisdiction and Stoker could file a claim under §35-178(1).

Additionally, in Sheppick v. Albertson's, Inc.

2 97 Utah

Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah 1996), in footnote 2, the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
The provision granting the Commission
continuing
jurisdiction
emphasizes
the
exclusivity of the Commission's jurisdiction
over workers' compensation claims. Under
general common law doctrine, the entry of a
14

judgment for damages based on personal
injuries would bar subsequent actions based on
the same injury. Such is not the case under
the Act. The Commission is empowered to adjust
the award in accordance with changes in
circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78.
Such changes could include a deterioration of
the former employee's condition or the
discovery of a previously unnoticed injury.
See, e.g., Stoker v. Workers' Compensation
Fund,
889 P.2d
409, 412
(Utah
1994)
(commission can reopen case if previously used
conservative method of treatment proved
ineffective);
Barber
Asphalt
Corp.
v.
Industrial ComnTn, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266
(1943) (commission may reconsider case if
there has been some new development that
suggests award may have been excessive or
inadequate); Spring Canyon Coal Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah 553, 210 P. 611
(1922) (commission authorized to alter award
when amputated leg failed to heal sufficiently
to use prosthesis). (Emphasis added).
Id. at 14.
In the Workers' Compensation Rules, the Industrial Commission
has provided a form called, "Claim for Protection of Rights - Form
002." R568-1-3(F). The Commission states that that form is to be,
"[u]sed by an injured employee for the sole purpose of protecting
his/her rights even though a dispute does not exist.

Copies are

forwarded to all parties concerned. NOTE: THIS FORM DOES NOT NEED
TO BE FILED WHEN ANY OTHER APPLICATION HAS BEEN FILED."

in the original and emphasis added).

(Uppercase

Clearly the Industrial

Commission recognizes that an application for any claim gives the
Industrial Commission jurisdiction over all subsequent claims.
When

an

insurance

company

and

an

injured

employee

are

cooperating the employee has no need to file a formal application
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for hearing.
this

case.

That is why Dutson is still good law and applies to
How

would

the

Industrial

Commission

ever

get

jurisdiction in a case where the employer and the employee are
cooperating for a full six years?

The defendants' position would

require the applicant to file a formal application for hearing on
every case, regardless of the cooperation between the parties.
This is contrary to Utah law. see Stoker. 889 P.2d 409. In fact,
defendants position would have a chilling effect on any cooperation
because, according to defendants, the Industrial Commission does
not have jurisdiction unless an employee files an application for
hearing for every claim.
Furthermore, the public policy considerations for giving the
Industrial

Commission

continuing

jurisdiction

are

also

very

compelling. If this Court adopts the defendants' position, then an
employer or its insurance company can string an injured employee
along until after the six year statute of limitations has run.
This can be done in good or bad faith.

For example, the employer

could provide a severally injured employee a light duty job and
conservative treatment. At the end of six years it could terminate
the employee.

Pursuant to Savage v. Educators Insurance Co., 908

P.2d 862 (Utah 1995) an applicant has no recourse for bad faith in
a workers' compensation claim, unless there is privity of contract.
Therefore, the insurance company has no liability because the
Industrial Commission has no jurisdiction.

The employee has no

recourse because he trusted the insurance company.
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The defendants' callous interpretation of the statute goes far
beyond the well established law of Utah concerning the purpose of
the Worker's Compensation Act.

In Norton v. The Industrial

Comm'n., 728 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court stated,
"[i]t need not be restated at great length that the Workmen' s
Compensation Act is to be liberally construed and that any doubt
respective the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of
the injured employee."

Id. (emphasis added).

Therefore, the

Commission has continuing jurisdiction in this case or else the
statute will be construed so narrowly that Mr. Vigos will be left
with no remedy.

REPLY POINT IV
PORTIONS
OF DEFENDANTS'S
BRIEFS
MUST
BE
STRICKEN BECAUSE THEY CITE TO FACTS THAT ARE
NOT PART OF THE RECORD.
L a s t l y , t h e I n d u s t r i a l Commission has f i l e d a b r i e f

in t h i s

matter and has a t t a c h e d t o t h a t b r i e f s e v e r a l items t h a t are not
included in t h e r e c o r d .

The Commission's b r i e f

e n t i r e l y on t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l f a c t s 7 .
"all

relevant

facts

in

i s based almost

The Fund s t a t e s in i t s b r i e f ,

t h e Bradley case

are

addressed

in

the

In fact, applicant's attorney could not find one citation to the record
in the entire brief.
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Industrial Commission's brief."

The Fund's brief, p. 11.

The

defendants failed to move this Court to supplement the record.
It is well settled in Utah that, "[e]vidence not available to
the trial judge cannot be added to the record on appeal . . . ."
Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah
App. 1989).

In State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995, 1005, (Utah App.

1992) (Bench, P.J., dissenting), Judge Bench stated, "Our duty is
to review the findings actually made by the trial court, not to
make our own findings." Id.

For what ever reason, the defendants

have decided to wait until now to dispute factual matters that were
raised twice below.8

(R. 47-8 and 68-9.)

Therefore, this Court

should strike the portions of defendants' briefs that rely on facts
outside of the record.
CONCLUSION

Defendants do not dispute that the last event necessary for a
claim for permanent total disability to accrue is that the employee
must be disabled.

Defendants' claim that Mr. Vigos was aware of

his injury on October 13, 1988 contradicts their admissions that
Mr. Vigos applied for disability on January 24, 1994; that the
Social Security Administration determined him to be disabled on

Applicant's counsel takes offense at defendants' statement that
applicant's counsel "misleads this Court by failing to provide the complete facts
in Bradley . . . ." The Fund's brief, p. 11. Applicant's counsel made those
factual claims in good faith and based upon his honest and best recollection of the
Bradley case. Defendants were put on notice when applicant's attorney argued the
same facts on two prior occasions in this case, first to the ALJ and then to the
Commission. (R. 47-8 and 67-8) Defendants should have raised their contested facts
below to make them part of the record. To now dispute the facts, and at the same
time, question applicant's counsel's integrity is completely inappropriate.
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January 1, 1993; that he was still employed on October 25, 1994;
and, that he was released to return to work on May 8, 1989 without
any restrictions.

Mr. Vigos did not know his claim had accrued

until he was disabled.

That is when the statute of limitations

should have started to run.
If the statute started to run on October 13, 1988 then the
statute is a statute of repose because it extinguished Mr. Vigos'
constitutional right to litigate a valid claim before his right to
file that claim arose.

At a minimum it reduced the statute by

several years, which also is a violation of his constitutional
rights.
If

the

Industrial

Commission

does

not

have

continuing

jurisdiction, then the Industrial Commission will never have
jurisdiction

over cases where the insurance

employee cooperate for six years.

company

and the

Even if the insurance company

does so in bad faith, the employee is left with no remedy, simply
because he or she cooperated with the insurance company instead of
filing for a claim. Alternatively, the Industrial Commission will
be deluged with claims even for the slightest of injury, simply to
preserve any potential claims.
Lastly, the Industrial Commission filed a brief that contains
facts not in the record. Both defendants rely on these facts; yet,
neither

defendant

filed

a motion

to

supplement

the

record.

Consequently, this Court should strike any portions of the briefs
that rely on those facts.
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Therefore, this

Court

should

rule

that

the

statute of

limitations started to run on the day that Mr. Vigos became
permanently totally disabled. Because there is a question of fact
as to when that occurred, this Court should remand it back to the
Industrial Commission. Alternatively, if the statute began to run
on October 13, 1988, then this Court should rule that the statute
is a statute of repose because it begins to run before the last
event necessary to bring a claim and by so doing deprives Mr. Vigos
of his constitutional right to pursue his claim.
this

Court

should

rule

that

the

Industrial

Alternatively,
Commission

continuing jurisdiction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 6th day of November, 1996.
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